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This article examines some ofthe many shortcomings of the mental health system oper-
ated by the Massachusetts Department ofMental Health (DMH) and explores the impact
of that system on single homeless individuals who sufferfrom someform ofserious or
long-term mental disability. To afford that discussion context, however, the article first
briefly examines those forces which have, and have not, significantly contributed to the
large number ofmentally disabled homeless persons. It suggests certain changes, includ-
ing a shift in departmentalfocusfrom hospitals to community services and the creation
ofa housing subsidy system exclusivelyforDMH clients, which would allowDMH to end
its currentpractice ofat best ignoring, and at worst actually causing, the homelessness of
mentally disabledpeople.
The Deinstitutionalization Mythology
When discussing the disproportionate 1 presence of mental illness among individuals who
are currently homeless, one is often encouraged to address the relation between that
phenomenon and the process of state mental hospital deinstitutionalization that has
been under way for approximately thirty years. This is not a useful undertaking for sev-
eral reasons. First, it assumes that there is somehow a significant causal relationship
between the two. At least for Massachusetts, this is demonstrably incorrect. A study of
homeless adults done for the state Department of Mental Health (DMH) determined
that the "average" such person was thirty-eight years old, and that just about half the
population was under age thirty-five.2 While DMH has reduced its inpatient population
from 20,000 in 1960 to just over 2,000 today,3 over half of that decrease was accom-
plished by 1970. Further, the people discharged during that period had typically been
institutionalized for years at a time. Thus, they could not, as a group, represent the cur-
rently homeless unless DMH hospitalized and discharged them when they were verita-
ble children. Otherwise they would now simply be too old to yield the profile revealed by
the DMH study. Whatever their fate, those who were discharged and neglected twenty-
five years ago do not constitute a significant percentage of today's homeless.
Steven A. Hitov is a staffattorney in the Homelessness Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services and the
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A second shortcoming of focusing on deinstitutionalization is its suggestion that
homelessness among those who suffer from a mental disability is somehow a medical
rather than a social problem, one that has presumably resulted from prematurely dis-
continued treatment. At best this entices one and, as we shall see, has led DMH to
focus on varying forms of "treatment," rather than housing, as a potential solution. At
worst, it suggests that reinstitutionalization may be a viable response to homelessness.
The data on this topic simply do not support such a conclusion. In separate studies
conducted in Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio, researchers determined that while
approximately 30 percent of the homeless people they interviewed had major mental
health problems and most of them needed some mental health services, only 5 percent
to 7 percent would even benefit from, much less require, inpatient care to meet their
needs.4 Unless we as a society are willing to forcibly hospitalize vast numbers of people
who do not require such care in order to "capture" the relatively few who might, rein-
stitutionalization cannot possibly be viewed as a rational response to the problem of
homelessness among those with mental disabilities. This is particularly true when one
considers that the current average cost of maintaining a person in an institution in
Massachusetts ranges between $126,000 and $178,000 per year. 5 Even people who are
so frustrated with the persistence of homelessness that they might otherwise be tempted
by this "out-of-sight-out-of-mind" approach must rethink their position or be willing
to shoulder enormous tax increases in support of their viewpoint.
Unfortunately, the focus on deinstitutionalization is not merely a benign mistake. It
serves both to misdirect one's attention when searching for solutions, and also, inten-
tionally or otherwise, to obfuscate the fact that the current crisis of homelessness is the
direct and predictable result of more than a decade of government policies aimed at
dismantling the very structures that formerly allowed large numbers of desperately
poor people to maintain a home. While the correlation between the Reagan adminis-
tration's attack on public and subsidized housing6 and the current rise in homelessness
is now widely recognized as a true social disaster, it is one that predictably had a dis-
proportionate impact on poor people with mental handicaps, who regularly lose out
when competing with others for increasingly scarce housing resources.
Compounding the woes of this already embattled group was the less well-known
attack that Ronald Reagan waged specifically against them. Between 1981 and 1983,
the Social Security Administration arbitrarily terminated the Supplemental Security
Income and Social Security Disability benefits of approximately 50,000 people who
suffered from mental disabilities.7 While subsequent lawsuits were successful in having
benefits restored to two thirds of those who had been terminated, that still left almost
17,000 people with mental disabilities without what was almost certainly their only
source of income. It is the stuff of fantasy to assume that large numbers of these
people did not become homeless as a result of having that income abruptly terminated.
In addition, it is almost certain that significant numbers of those who ultimately
had their benefits restored were nonetheless rendered homeless, given that landlords
are neither required nor inclined to forgo collecting rent while tenants are busy dis-
puting the actions of the federal government. Once housing is lost, the restoration of
benefits often does little to help an individual regain a place to live, for the front-end
costs of acquiring housing (first month's rent, security deposit, finder's fee, and moving
expenses) are almost always beyond the ability of a poor person to pay.
Thus, deinstitutionalization in fact has had little to do with the current general epi-
demic of homelessness among the mentally disabled. When the federal government
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decides to wage a war on the poor, it should come as no surprise that the most vul-
nerable among those living in poverty will be disproportionately affected. Given that
the Reagan administration's economic smart bombs were specifically targeted upon
affordable housing and people with mental disabilities, it would indeed be a minor
miracle if the mentally ill were not overrepresented among the single homeless.
DMH's Inside-Out Service System
While it is incorrect to focus on deinstitutionalization as the cause of homelessness,
it is nonetheless important to recognize that the mental health system operated by
DMH does regularly contribute to homelessness among the mentally ill, both
directly and indirectly. As this part of the article will demonstrate, the "medical
model" of service delivery utilized by DMH has largely been, when viewed either
economically or as a matter of social policy, a failure for everyone except the profes-
sionals who staff it, and has proved especially ineffective in addressing the mental
health needs of the homeless.
The current system has historically, conceptually, and financially always started
with hospitals, and only then, almost as an afterthought, considered other options for
allowing people with mental health problems to continue or resume functioning as
contributing citizens in their communities. The results of such a hospital-centered,
doctor-driven approach are, as a matter of resource allocation, quite appalling. DMH
is currently expending 42 percent of its resources (over $192 million) on inpatient
care, which serves only 6 percent of its clients. 8 As of May 1991, more than 500 of
2,156 inpatients9 were being detained solely because DMH had not located or devel-
oped sufficient community placements for them. 10 So, in addition to spending enor-
mous amounts of money on a tiny fraction of its clients, DMH is expending almost
25 percent of that sum— more than $45 million— on people who, it admits, do not
require, and almost certainly do not desire, such care.
Unfortunately, the misallocation of resources is not the only, or even necessarily
the most egregious, cost of the DMH service delivery system. The hospital-centered
medical model views life in the community as a privilege to be earned by those who
have required hospitalization. All DMH inpatients, regardless of their condition, start
with enforced confinement11 on a locked ward— sometimes in seclusion— and then
proceed to earn the "privilege" (so described by the DMH Inpatient Policy Manual)
of increased freedom. Initially a person may be given permission to go to unlocked
parts of the facility, then onto the grounds, and ultimately to visit the community. At
all times, however, even this limited freedom is subject to the person's willingness and
ability to comply with all of a facility's rules, no matter how petty or seemingly unre-
lated to treatment. Independence, either of thought or action, is not a characteristic
highly valued, or wisely exhibited, within a DMH facility. The inpatient system is so
control oriented that, regardless of treatment needs, facilities have been known to
discharge people directly to the streets or to shelters, even in the dead of winter,
because of perceived violations of "program" rules (such as taking legal, but unpre-
scribed, medications). In short, the inpatient system is one in which clients are
afforded only rudimentary rights and client choice has little or no meaningful role.
If one then views community placements, as DMH does, as a person's "next step"
following an inpatient experience like that just described, it is not surprising that
DMH has chosen to develop "programs," rather than housing, for those seeking to
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return to the community. Of the approximately 3,255 12 people now being served in
DMH residential settings, probably fewer than 100 are residing in DMH's most
touted independent living initiative, apartments administered by the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) to which DMH and the Department of Mental
Retardation have negotiated access. 13 The vast majority of people who count on
DMH for residence in the community are living not in houses but in programs.
Programs differ from housing in several critical respects, both in human and
financial/development terms. First and foremost, programs reflect the medical
model mentality that perceives people with mental disabilities as perpetual patients,
with the resultant infantilization that so often accompanies that status. Additionally,
or perhaps merely as an example of that infantilization, programs often require
unrelated adults to share not only their bousing, but even their bedrooms. Nearly
65 percent of the settings for DMH residential services are located in buildings in
which only other DMH clients live. 14 In nearly a third of those settings, people are
forced to share their bedrooms with someone not of their choosing. 15 This is not
how most adults choose to live, and even DMH recognizes that it is often clinically
dysfunctional. 16 Groups of eight unrelated adults simply do not often choose to live
together. Indeed, the skyrocketing national divorce rate suggests that more and
more groups of two are experiencing difficulty in achieving this feat.
Nonetheless, communal living is exactly what DMH demands of most of its clients
in residential programs. The stress of such an environment is compounded by the
fact that a person must conform not only to the norms of general tenancy, but also
to any treatment requirements that DMH decides accompany the program. In this
way, programs perpetuate the control and compliance regimes of the inpatient facil-
ities. Should someone decide that he does not like or no longer needs the type of
treatment that is being offered in a given program, he is faced not only with the loss
of services but with the specter of imminent homelessness. 17 This is hardly an envi-
ronment in which one is likely to question the services being rendered. As a result,
consumer choice and input, and ultimately the quality of any services offered, are
also victims of the current DMH system.
At the opposite end of the human experience spectrum, but of equal importance,
is the situation in which a person is quite happy with a given program and therefore
flourishes in it. Such a scenario suggests a happy ending, but that is not always the
case. A person who has come to consider a program of a given intensity level to be
home, and thrives there, risks being removed from her home exactly because she is
doing so well. The "better" she does, the greater the chance that she will have to
move to a lower intensity program so that someone else can benefit from the pro-
gram she found to be so rewarding. While from a medical perspective the person
might be expected to be joyous about her perceived improvement, from a human
perspective she is more likely to be distraught at the prospect of losing perhaps the
first true home she has known. Perversely, this possibility builds in an incentive for a
person not to do too well if she indeed likes her situation. Thus, even an apparently
"successful" program may prove in the long run to be injurious.
Human costs are not the only ones associated with a system that assumes it must
provide residential programs in order to return people to the community. While it
now appears that, as a result of the Governor's Special Commission inquiry, Mas-
sachusetts has finally decided to address the abysmal condition— both finances and
quality of care 18— of its public inpatient psychiatric facilities, that undertaking is
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being made more difficult by the method of community service delivery utilized by
DMH. The commission has called for the creation of 700 additional community
placements by the end of June 1993 to accommodate current inpatients 19 who do not
now or will not by then need inpatient care. This initiative is part of an overall plan
to reduce the inpatient capacity of state facilities while, it is hoped, improving, but at
a minimum not reducing, the quality of care currently being provided to anyone.
The commission has identified two major problems in accomplishing the creation
of the additional community placements. Both, as it turns out, are problems that
exist solely because of the limited approach to community care employed by DMH.
First, because so many of DMH's present and projected residential settings are pro-
gram oriented and congregate in nature, they require substantial lead time, and money,
just to acquire and develop the property in which they operate. Consequently, the
ability to respond even to anticipated need is quite limited. The financial and logisti-
cal ability to accommodate unanticipated demand is nonexistent. This reality has led
DMH to perceive that it is caught in a chicken-and-egg situation in which it recog-
nizes that it can save money by discontinuing unnecessary inpatient care, but cannot
afford to do so because it lacks the finances and properties necessary to provide more
appropriate and cheaper, but by no means inexpensive, 20 care in the community. 21 Thus,
the entire system is constantly backed up by the difficulty of developing programs of
varying intensity levels necessary to respond to ever-changing client need.
Unfortunately, as the commission report also recognizes, the problems for the
typical DMH community residential program do not end when the money has been
found to finance it. Because the programs so often create congregations ofDMH
clients, the now familiar NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) syndrome regularly rears its
provincial head. Neighborhoods and even whole cities all too frequently attempt to
erect barriers to the siting of community residences. While the law is increasingly
clear that such efforts are illegal, defeating them and winning over a neighborhood
is both difficult and time-consuming work. Moreover, it is work that often turns
what should be a very private affair, namely, a person's desired choice of residence,
into a public, if not a political, debate. This process only exacerbates the already
lengthy delays inherent in developing necessary community resources.22
The inability of the current community residential system to respond on an "as
needed" basis has a disproportionate negative impact on homeless individuals with
mental disabilities, many ofwhom are "pink-papered," that is, forcibly admitted pur-
suant to M.G.L. c. 123, §12, to DMH inpatient facilities following acute psychiatric
episodes on the street. Such individuals definitionally enter the facilities in need of
housing as well as acute care, but their inpatient stays are often quite short, varying in
length from overnight to one or two weeks. While, as a matter of law, people admitted
pursuant to Section 12 are entitled to an individual service plan (ISP) designed to
assess and address both their medical and social needs, 23 in practice ISPs are almost
never afforded to such short-term inpatients. As a consequence, the homeless men-
tally disabled receive virtually no assistance even in applying for the public benefit
programs for which they may be eligible before they are again discharged.
Further, because of the chronic shortage of community placements and the inher-
ent difficulty of creating and siting new ones of the type now most often utilized, it
should come as no surprise that DMH maintains lengthy waiting lists for such place-
ments and is reluctant at best to insert a more recently admitted inpatient at the top
of such a list simply because he happens to have absolutely nowhere to live. As a
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result, homeless individuals who have been pink-papered to DMH facilities are reg-
ularly discharged by those facilities right back to the street or to a singles shelter,
where they must sleep in crowded, open barracks with numerous other equally poor
and otherwise troubled people and walk the streets from dawn to dusk each day
while the shelters are closed. As one might easily predict, many of those so discharged
quickly wind up back in the facility, often in worse condition than upon their initial
admission. This practice is so pervasive, and so inherently clinically inappropriate,
that in the past year, following two years of ultimately fruitless negotiations, two
separate lawsuits seeking to curtail it have been filed against DMH. 24
The present system constantly undermines independence by demanding and
rewarding compliance, in the guise of teaching personal responsibility, and enforces
that demand by tying it directly to the provision of housing. It is a system that is both
enormously expensive and wasteful, at least partly because it continues to elevate the
perceived need for treatment above the obvious need for food and housing. In short,
it is a system in need of a total overhaul if it is ever to achieve the national goal, set
forth in the recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act,25 of integrating as many
disabled citizens as possible, as fully as possible, back into the community.
Providing Housing with Desired Supports
As the Governor's Special Commission has determined, the entire DMH delivery
system must be revamped if it is ever to operate effectively and efficiently. Many of
the reforms suggested in the commission report are worthy of careful consideration
and likely to lead to more humane service. Certainly the general thrust of the report,
that citizens with mental disabilities are both better and more efficiently served in
their community, is one that should be embraced as a matter of public policy, but in
any event will soon have to be adopted as a matter of law.26 Nonetheless, despite its
considerable merits, the commission report's approach to actually providing com-
munity residential options can best be described as "do more of the same." As noted
above, such an approach, if not doomed to failure, is at least so cumbersome that it
is probably politically impossible to sustain the will to accomplish it. More impor-
tant, it would merely perpetuate, although relocate, the segregation and disempow-
erment of the mentally disabled. Hence, at a time when Massachusetts is finally
taking a hard look at its mental health system, it is critical that it start down the
road toward a delivery model that will actually work.
The cornerstone of a functional community mental health system must be stable
housing that is not conditioned on a person's willingness to participate in treatment.
Only in this way can DMH overcome its addiction to the medical model that has
been such a dismal failure at realizing community care. The separation of housing
from treatment will foster the very independence that DMH purports to desire, as it
will for the first time allow services to be consumer driven. When not faced with the
Hobson's choice of accepting all offered services in order to be housed or rejecting
those services and facing homelessness, people will clearly indicate which services
they find helpful by utilizing those which are and rejecting those which are not.
This is not to say that persuasion should be forsaken as an option, or that people
should not be made aware of the possible adverse consequences of any given course
of conduct. However, it will force such persuasion to be just that, and not coercion.
Such an approach, in turn, will offer DMH planners useful guidance in future pro-
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gram development and offer private not-for-profit providers a market incentive to
be responsive to the perceived needs and preferences of their consumers. In short,
citizens with mental disabilities will actually have a meaningful voice in meeting
their needs.
If housing is to be the foundation of the community mental health system, how is it
best provided? The answer to this question must take into consideration the problems
that the mentally disabled have traditionally experienced in gaining access to housing.
DMH has realized since at least 1985 that part of the cause of homelessness among
those with mental disabilities is that such people regularly lose out when competing
with other groups for any scarce resource, especially housing. 27 Therefore, any housing
assistance provided in conjunction with a true community mental health system must
be targeted and reserved exclusively for the mentally disabled. 28 Further, it must be
designed to afford the target population the greatest choice possible, in order to
redress the past and present proclivity of society (and DMH) to segregate those with
mental health problems. Next, it must be reasonably plentiful, so that DMH can elimi-
nate the dual shameful practices of unnecessarily detaining those who do not require
inpatient care and discharging vulnerable people directly to the streets or to over-
crowded and devitalizing shelters. Finally, but of paramount importance if the system
is to address the issue of homelessness among the mentally handicapped, the housing
must be affordable. Market-rate apartments in Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency developments are no answer for this population.
Fortunately, an option exists that would meet all the above criteria. Rather than
attempting to "develop" either residential milieus or even housing, DMH should
immediately implement a housing subsidy program funded, if necessary, entirely with
current mental health dollars. The program would operate much like the federal Sec-
tion 8 Existing Housing program, which requires a person to pay no more than 30 per-
cent of his or her income toward a predetermined fair market rent (FMR) for existing
private housing in the community, and then pays the landlord the difference between
the tenant's share and the FMR. The program would be available only to those eligi-
ble to receive services from DMH who lack an appropriate, affordable place to call
home. If financially necessary, it could be further limited to DMH's priority popula-
tion, those with a serious or long-term mental impairment. Thus, a finite population
eligible for such a housing benefit29 would not be competing with the general popula-
tion to acquire it.
Included in the eligible population, whether defined broadly or narrowly, would
always be those who have been admitted as inpatients at a DMH facility. This, in
conjunction with the housing search and other ISP services discussed below, should
completely eliminate both the long waiting lists for placement and the discharge of
homeless people to the streets or shelters. Few have claimed that there is a shortage
of housing in this country, only that there is a critical shortage of affordable housing.
By operating its own subsidy program, DMH would gain for its clients ready access
to the existing private housing market, which, especially when the rental market is
soft, is only too eager to rent to those whose rent payments are government guaran-
teed. Because the subsidies would be mobile and travel with the mentally disabled,
the program would also accomplish community integration to the maximum extent
possible while achieving the generally accepted programmatic benefit of having
service dollars follow the beneficiary, not the provider.
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Finally, the subsidy must not be tied to the acceptance of treatment or services of
any kind. Rather, it would be available to any DMH (priority) client who lacked a
suitable place to live. While clients might reasonably be required to listen to what
other services existed, they would be entirely free to reject them all and accept only
the housing subsidy.
Among the services available must be knowledgeable and flexible assistance in
searching for habitable housing. While such a service would assist people to find hous-
ing, it would not decide which housing a person would choose or with whom, if any-
body, the person should live. It would be fine for two or more people to choose to live
together, but such a living arrangement would never be forced on anyone. The Mas-
sachusetts experience with housing search workers employed by the Department of
Public Welfare (DPW) to help homeless families locate qualifying apartments is quite
instructive regarding the value of this kind of assistance, as is the method utilized
within the Homelessness Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS). Before the
recent softening of the housing market, only about 50 percent of the unassisted fami-
lies with Section 8 certificates were successful in renting an apartment before their cer-
tificates expired. 30 In contrast, over 90 percent of the families who had housing search
workers assigned by DPW were able to rent within the same time frame. This discrep-
ancy in results reflects the irrational and labyrinthine nature of the country's afford-
able housing system and demonstrates graphically that it takes professional help for
almost anyone to negotiate it successfully.
While citizens with mental disabilities, taken as a group, may be more difficult to
house than poor families,31 1, in my job assignment to break down the legal barriers
facing homeless mentally disabled people, have so far failed to house only one of the
clients who have sought assistance from GBLS in the past two years. Once GBLS is
successful in acquiring a housing subsidy for a client, it assigns a student intern from
the Boston University School of Social Work to work with that person to locate a
qualifying apartment owned by a landlord willing to participate in the program. Like
interns in a law office, the students can offer their opinions to clients, but ultimately
it is the clients' wishes that control. If a client chooses to make a "bad" decision, that
is his or her right. In fact, our clients have made very few such decisions (at least in
my opinion) and have proved to be every bit as diligent and creative in their housing
search as one might expect from a person afforded the possibility of access to a
decent, affordable home for perhaps the first time in his or her life.
Nonetheless, the social work students play a valuable role in the process. First, they
provide a nonjudgmental companion with whom the homeless disabled person can
share any anxieties that he may be experiencing in the search process. They also pro-
vide a "professional" presence when the client interviews for a particular apartment,
thus overcoming or easing the unfounded fears that a landlord may have about dealing
with a mentally disabled person. Finally, the students are willing "to do what it takes"32
to ensure a successful result. So far, this category has included such endeavors as help-
ing a client acquire and move furniture on a Saturday, purchasing two telephones (one
was stolen on the client's last night in a singles shelter) so that he would not feel isolated
in the new apartment, and arranging to have a broken television repaired to provide a
client with entertainment and company. This is exactly the sort of hands-on approach
that is sometimes necessary and that DMH must be willing to provide.
Again, the mechanism exists to do the sort of housing search to ensure that the
proposed DMH subsidy system will work. DMH employs large numbers— although
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never enough— of case managers, who are supposed to help plan an inpatient's
smooth return to the community. While case management is another DMH service that
has suffered at the altar of hospital worship, it must and can be revived to serve citizens
in the community. A good start in this direction would be to employ ex-patients as case
managers and assistants to case managers. They would bring a wealth of experience
and understanding to the job and, predictably, be more willing "to do what it takes,"
nonjudgmentally, to help a person avoid what is often the horror of institutionaliza-
tion. As one New York consumer case manager ironically explained, his employment
has allowed him to look back on his twenty years of institutionalization not simply as a
maddening waste of his life, but also as on-the-job training for his new endeavors. 33
Employing ex-patients for this purpose can only benefit everyone involved.
Whatever the source or background of case managers, there must be many more
of them and they must be trained, at a minimum, to do housing search and public
benefits applications for people who desire those services. It is a veritable crime that
so many obviously disabled homeless individuals pass through DMH facilities with-
out anybody's assisting them to acquire the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and
Social Security Disability (SSDI) benefits to which they are almost certainly entitled.
Locating homeless individuals and getting them to apply for assistance are two of
the major hurdles in maximizing their income. In addition, an application for either
SSI or SSDI requires substantial medical documentation.
Thus, it is absurd that when DMH is holding such a person in a hospital, it makes
no effort to see that the person receives these federal benefits. Instead, homeless
people are disgorged as they enter, often with either no income at all or the lesser,
but entirely state paid, stipend available from General Relief. Therefore both the
individual and the state are worse off financially because of DMH's current prac-
tices. Case managers and other DMH employees who learn nothing but housing
search and income maximization will have gone a long way toward increasing the
stability of life in the community for many citizens with mental disabilities.
Once DMH has, as part of its mission and raison d'etre, provided affordable
housing, facilitated access to public benefit programs, and offered employment to
those who need and desire such assistance, it can begin to offer other, treatment-
oriented services to assist clients to maintain and enjoy their place in the commu-
nity. As previously noted, these services, by becoming consumer driven, will be more
likely to exhibit the flexibility necessary to accommodate the individual needs and
preferences of the people they are designed to serve.
What then is wrong with this seemingly wonderful system? The answer, in short, is
nothing. The two concerns most often raised by those wed to the medical model of
control and compliance are that the system is viable only for the less impaired and
that it would be too expensive to implement. Neither claim is supported by the avail-
able data or by experience in other states that closely resemble Massachusetts in size
and nature.
In 1989, the Center for Community Change through Housing and Support con-
ducted a national survey of 378 supported housing programs. 34 It evaluated programs
using criteria that included basing housing on people's choices, using integrated regu-
lar housing, providing flexible supports, not imposing program requirements, and
maintaining housing during periods of crisis or hospitalization. In other words, it
sought and found programs operated pursuant to the approaches described in this
article. The survey discovered that individuals served in supported housing settings
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tended to be more, not less, disabled than those served in more traditional residential
programs. Because the system is premised on stable, varied housing options but-
tressed by flexible service supports, the severity of the handicap that can be accom-
modated is limited only by the creativity of those providing support.
Nor would a model premised on the provision of a housing subsidy to each DMH
client who lacked a home cost any more than the current system. Indeed, it could
operate much more effectively than the present system for less money than is now
being spent. 35 A single person can be subsidized in his or her own apartment in
Massachusetts for no more than $5,000 per year, or just over $400 per month. 36 This
is an incredible bargain when one considers that the cost, largely underwritten by
state and municipal governments, of maintaining a person in a singles shelter is
more than $30 per night, or almost $1,000 per month. For the cost of inappropri-
ately sheltering each mentally disabled person, DMH could affordably and, even
with absolutely no services, more appropriately house two of them.
DMH and the city of Boston statistics indicate that, statewide, somewhere between
500 and 2,500 people who are "on the street" might need and qualify for the subsidy
proposed here. Even using a worst-case scenario, each of those people could be housed
for a total annual cost of no more than $12 million. If one then factored in the 500
people being detained solely because DMH lacks a more appropriate place for them,
the total annual cost of housing all those DMH clients who needed it would be $15 mil-
lion. As we have seen, DMH acknowledges that it is currently spending three times that
amount annually just to detain inappropriately the latter group of 500 people.
The short-term savings are compelling, as is the flexibility such a system affords.
Since a subsidy is simply money, it entails no development time. So DMH could
accommodate fluctuations in demand for the most difficult component of community
care, space, without either lengthy delays in times of increased demand or vacant
buildings when demand wanes. Further, but of critical importance, the existing
private housing would be dispersed throughout the community, thereby avoiding
the siting problems incurred by more concentrated housing arrangements and best
serving the national goal of maximum integration. Necessary and desired services and
supports would then be supplied where the client lived, rather than the client being
made to live where those services are available, but not necessarily desired. The
system would benefit the disabled and other community members alike. Even those
DMH clients who continued to require long-term inpatient care would benefit by
hospitals of a more manageable size with a staff better able to pay attention to
each individual's needs.
However, a DMH subsidy program would most dramatically benefit the "home-
Jess mentally ill." The medical model looks at this group and sees mentally disabled
people who happen to be homeless. Starting from this perspective it attempts to
"cure," or at least control, the illness, and refuses to or has no professional interest in
housing those for whom treatment proves unavailing. A true community model of
care based on affordable housing would view the same group as homeless people who
happen to have a mental disability. Even, or perhaps especially, if their homelessness
is caused by or related to their mental disabilities, 37 it makes absolutely no sense,
either medically or socially, to ignore the symptom— homelessness— because the
infirmity cannot be corrected. A similar approach with regard to a physical disability
would have doctors refusing to prescribe painkillers for a person with a chronically
bad back because they could not, or the patient would not let them, diagnose or cure
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the cause of the pain. Each of these approaches is equally absurd, but only the former
is practiced.
DMH should provide a subsidy to each of its clients who requires one in order to
avoid homelessness, whether or not the person is interested in any of the other ser-
vices that the agency may have to offer. This is exactly the approach, taken in Ohio
and New York, which is getting rave reviews from the mental health professionals
responsible for administering the programs. 38 Indeed, exhibiting a rationality rarely
demonstrated by a bureaucracy, New York has included such assistance as a furni-
ture grant and an emergency needs fund to ensure that those it discharges from its
inpatient facilities do not end up both mentally disabled and homeless. The essential
point is that even if the former condition is considered a given, the latter need not be.
Equipped with the proper perspective, a targeted subsidy program and flexible
supports, DMH could end homelessness among the mentally disabled population of
the commonwealth almost immediately. Further, it could do so without spending
any more, and perhaps less, money than it now does. At a time when its delivery
system is being reexamined anyhow, DMH should jettison its reliance on a medical
model that has arguably contributed to, but unarguably failed to address, the prob-
lem of homelessness among those with mental disabilities. By adopting a subsidy
system just for its clients, with services developed to address their expressed needs,
DMH would provide better care, integrate and empower the disabled as the law will
soon require, and perhaps most important, end homelessness among that portion of
the commonwealth's population for which the Department of Mental Health is
legally responsible. Z+
Notes
1. For health planning purposes it is generally assumed that approximately one percent of the
overall population suffers from some form of serious or long-term mental illness. The best
available data concerning the single homeless suggests that roughly 30 percent of that popu-
lation has serious mental health problems. See note 4 and accompanying text.
2. See Virginia Mulkern, Homelessness Needs Assessment Study: Findings and Recommendations
for the Massachusetts Department ofMental Health (1985), ii. Hereafter cited as Homelessness
Needs Assessment.
3. Boston Emergency Shelter Commission, Commitment and Compassion (Winter 1990-1991):
p. 10.
4. See Mulkern, Homelessness Needs Assessment, and Access, a publication of the National
Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental Illness, 3, citing studies by Roth et al. in Ohio
(1985) and Struening in New York (1986).
5. Actions for Quality Care, Report of the Governor's Special Commission on Consolidation of
Health and Human Services Institutional Facilities, Executive Summary, June 1991, 8.
Hereafter cited as Commission Report.
6. Between 1980 and 1988, the federal budget authority for needed low-income housing
dropped from $27.9 billion to $9.7 billion. The Closing Door, National Coalition for the
Homeless, December 1990.
7. See Sarah Glazer, The Mentally III, in Editorial Research Reports, February 13, 1987, 72.
8. Commission Report, 3.
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9. DMH Comprehensive Mental Health Service Plan, Edition 4.0, May 1991, 117. Hereafter cited
as Comprehensive Plan.
1 0. Commission Report, 3.
1 1. While, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 123 (1988), Massachusetts, in theory has both voluntary
(section 10) and involuntary (sections 7, 8, 11, and 12) inpatients, it is the practice of DMH
facilities not to accept voluntary patients. Thus, a person is either brought to a facility against
his or her will and admitted and retained pursuant to sections 7, 8, and 12, or voluntarily seeks
treatment and is admitted pursuant to section 1 1 , on a "conditional voluntary" basis. Under
section 1 1, a person who is unsatisfied with the care is not free to leave, but rather must give
the facility three days' written notice of the intention to leave. During this period, the facility
may petition a court to have the person committed pursuant to sections 7 and 8. Since the
court hearing need not be, and most often is not, scheduled for fourteen days after the DMH
request, a person who enters a facility "voluntarily" can be forced to remain for up to seven-
teen days against his or her will without an opportunity for impartial review.
1 2. Commission Report, 3.
13. Ibid., 33. This arrangement has resulted in a total of fewer than 140 apartments being occu-
pied by clients of DMH and DMR. Fewer than 25 of those apartments are subsidized, which,
given the substantial market rents charged by MHFA developments, means that the vast
majority of independent-living situations being provided by DMH are going to its wealthier
clients. MHFA market-rent apartments are not a financially viable option for the homeless,
even if they could get accepted for occupancy at such developments. See note 22.
14. Comprehensive Plan, 119.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. As a further reflection of the fact that such programs are not really housing in any meaningful
sense, DMH, and unfortunately some courts, take the position that people living in DMH resi-
dential settings are not entitled to the protection of Massachusetts landlord-tenant law before
they can be removed from a program.
18. Only one of DMH's fifteen adult inpatient facilities has been able to meet the HCFA/JCAHO
minimum standards for accreditation. Commission Report, 5, 6.
19. It must be stressed that these placements will serve only current inpatients. The approxi-
mately 4,000 community placements that will exist after adding these 700 new ones will meet
only one third of DMH's perceived overall need. Commission Report, 28.
20. The cost of community placements ranges between $30,000 and $70,000 per person per year,




22. Even DMH's major effort to arrange truly independent, albeit expensive, living situations, that
is, the agreement with MHFA for access to 3 percent of its units built since 1979, is not as
expeditious as it may appear to be. The final decision regarding whether to accept a person as
a tenant rests with the management of the MHFA development, not with DMH. While DMH
often attempts to facilitate acceptance, MHFA developments are, in my experience and that of
others who attempt to house the homeless, among the most demanding and least flexible in
their tenant selection practices. This fact has two negative effects. First, it induces DMH to
seek to house only its "most worthy" (read compliant) clients. Second, the extensive verifica-
tions required by the developments again slow down the process of housing those who need
a place to stay.
23. Pursuant to 104 C.M.R. section 16.03(2)(c), anyone admitted to a DMH inpatient facility under
M.G.L. c. 123, sections 10, 11, or 12 "shall be eligible for ... an ISR"The goals of the ISP pro-
cess are set forth at 104 C.M.R. section16.01(2).
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24. Williams et al. v. Forsberg et ano., Civ. No. 91-3835E (Superior Ct., Suffolk Co.), and J.S. and
DM. v. Weld eta/.. Civ. No. 90-7275F (Superior Ct., Suffolk Co.). In the Williams case, the plain-
tiffs claim that DMH's discharge practices constitute the ongoing common law tort of negli-
gent discharge, and that, based on that and several other statutory and constitutional theories,
DMH should be ordered to provide the type of subsidy program suggested later in this article.
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), RL. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, July 26, 1990.
Section 2(a)(8) of the Act provides that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." People with mental disabilities are specifically
included in the coverage of the act by section 3(2)(A).
26. The ADA sections that govern the provision of government services, including mental health
services, took effect on January 27, 1992. The legislative history of the act makes it clear that
Congress intends services to be provided in the most integrated setting possible, even if
doing so is either logistically or financially less convenient for the provider. H.R. Rep. No.
485(lll), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990).
27
'. Homelessness Needs Assessment, Executive Summary, 130.
28. While the housing assistance provided by DMH must be reserved exclusively for the mentally
disabled, the actual housing acquired with that assistance should to the greatest extent possi-
ble be in normal, integrated settings open to all members of the general public.
29. Since DMH and its doctors believe themselves capable of defining and recognizing mental ill-
ness, a major problem in operating a general housing program is thereby overcome. In seeking
to assist the general homeless population through various housing initiatives, Massachusetts
has felt constrained to develop elaborate and often bizarre definitions of the "worthy" home-
less in order to protect itself from what it believes would otherwise be an epidemic of voluntar-
ily induced homelessness endured solely to gain access to affordable housing. It is highly
unlikely that, even for the substantial benefit of affordable housing, someone would voluntarily
seek the stigma still associated with mental illness. Even a person who might do so would pre-
sumably not be able to fool a DMH doctor. Hence, quality control should not be a significant
problem in the proposed program. See note 19 for DMH's estimate of the maximum number
of people who might qualify for such a program.
30. In the Section 8 program, a certificate is valid for no more than four months. If a person is
unable to find a qualifying apartment within that period, the person's right to a subsidy expires
and the certificate is given to the next person on the waiting list. There would be no purpose
for such a time limit in the program run by DMH. Unlike the Section 8 program, the number of
eligible people is relatively small and a subsidy would be offered to everyone who needed
one. Thus, there would be no need to pass the subsidy along if it were not converted into an
apartment within a fixed period of time.
31. While the barriers to housing the mentally disabled are all too well known, the routes around
or through those barriers are a relatively well-kept secret. For example, most people, including
many DMH case managers and a significant number of local housing authorities, do not real-
ize or acknowledge that mentally disabled persons are eligible for so-called elderly housing
developments or categorically eligible for almost all federal subsidies. Nor is it widely recog-
nized that the superficially neutral determination of whether an applicant is "capable of inde-
pendent living" is in fact an illegal and therefore impermissible inquiry into the nature and
extent of a person's disability. While the list of legal solutions to acquiring housing for the dis-
abled is too lengthy to be catalogued here, the point is that housing search workers can be
trained to recognize illegal procedures and respond to them. Once they have mastered the
field, they will become familiar with housing opportunities for the disabled that are not neces-
sarily available to other members of the general public.
32. To borrow a phrase from the Vermont Center for Community Change through Housing and
Support, a pioneering organization in the sorts of solutions suggested in this article.
33. Statement of Dick Gelman, Bronx, New York, May 29, 1991, at the Ninth National CSP
Learning Community Conference in Washington, D.C.
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34. See a newsletter of the center, In Community, 1, no. 1, (June 1991): 6.
35. Exactly how much the proposed model would cost in the long run is largely an unknown,
because the calculus depends on many policy decisions that would be made along the way
concerning the nature and quality of supports. The center study discussed in the text found
that as the severity of the impairments being accommodated increased, so did the cost of pro-
viding such accommodation. This model could be made to cost as much as the one now used
by DMH, but it would provide more complete and effective services. The center therefore sug-
gests that the supported model may not always be less expensive, but it will never be more
expensive for any given level of care. In all cases, moreover, because of the underlying human
assumptions of the model, it will provide better care for each dollar expended.
36. The median FMR for a studio apartment in Massachusetts is $465, while that for a one bed-
room is $561. Representing DMH's maximum liability per person, this would almost always be
reduced by one or both of the following factors. First, the tenant would contribute 30 percent
of his or her income toward the cost of the apartment. If the person were receiving, for exam-
ple, SSI at the current rate of $520 per month, the tenant share of approximately $160 per
month would reduce the cost to DMH, even based on the full median FMR, to $400 per
month. However, especially in a soft market, apartments are almost always available for
less than the FMR in any particular area. While the 1990 one-bedroom FMR for Medford, a
city within five miles of Boston, was $739, the actual average rent of all the Section 8 one-
bedroom apartments administered by the Medford Housing Authority that year was just
under $510 per month. When the predictable tenant share is deducted from this figure, the
cost to DMH is even less than that cited in the text.
37. Judging from late 1991 newspaper articles and so-called think pieces, it is becoming increas-
ingly popular to blame the homeless for their condition. Presumably this phenomenon reflects
the traditionally short attention span and low frustration threshold of the American public,
which, after unsuccessfully throwing very little money and even less thought at a problem, is
more than willing to blame a victim for his or her own fate. The in-vogue argument along
these lines points to the mentally disabled homeless and suggests that those who think the
problem is housing "just don't get it." In fact, the problem is housing, or at least affordable
housing, which is an enormously scarce resource. While a person's mental disability may
help explain why she in particular is homeless if she has been asked to compete in the open
market for that resource, it is no indication that she cannot live in a community if reasonable
accommodation is made for his or her handicap. A subsidized housing program exclusively
for those with mental disabilities is just such an accommodation.
38. Statements of Grace Lewis, state housing coordinator, Ohio DMH, and Robert Myers, director
of local operations and community capital, New York Office of Mental Health, delivered May
30, 1991, at the Ninth National CSP Learning Community Conference in Washington, D.C.
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